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A B S T R A C T
The aim of this article is to overcome the incomplete explanation of previous research findings on the societal
determinants of the educational fertility differentials in Europe. Our analysis draws on two overlooked factors, the
role of labour market setting and the diffusion of new values. Combining ESS, EVS and WVS data for 2004–2009
with contextual indicators on labour market setting and cultural orientations, our multilevel analysis shows that
labour market conditions in terms of share of part time jobs, dimension of public sector employment and strictness
of EPL do not systematically modify the gradient of fertility by parities. But instead, we observe a clear moderator
effect of attitudinal orientations. Results show that in societies where postmodernism is widespread, both high and
low educated women are less likely to have children. A high diffusion of gender egalitarianism is associated with a
reduction of the gradient through an increase of the likelihood of having a child especially for higher educated
women. This article concludes by highlighting some responses to societal polarization of fertility related to both
structural and cultural factors and indicates avenues for future research on the social stratification of fertility.
1. Background and objectives
Over the last few decades, developed countries have experienced an
extraordinary transformation in their demographic structure. Such phe-
nomena are (partly) the result of a steady decline in fertility due to the
postponement of entry into parenthood, the rise of childlessness and the
reduction of the total number of children in families (Freijka & Sobotka,
2008). The upsurge of women’s participation in higher education has
been identified as a major driving force behind these transformations
(Billari & Kohler, 2004). Sociological and demographic research (e.g.
Blossfeld & Huinink, 1991), in fact, typically has found that female
education is negatively associated with fertility. Nonetheless, recent
empirical evidence stresses that the negative correlation between female
educational attainment and family size is weakening and even turning
positive (e.g. Kravdal & Rindfuss, 2008). This reversal has occurred in
some countries such as Sweden (Andersson et al., 2008), France (Davie &
Mazuy, 2010) and the United States (Hazan & Zoabi, 2015), but not in
others, such as Italy (Impicciatore and Dalla Zuanna, 2017) and Spain
(Wood, Neels, & Kil, 2014). With this backdrop, the puzzle is why the
educational gradient in fertility varies across regions.
The understanding of contextual factors reinforcing or weakening
the female educational gradient of fertility would greatly help to solve
this puzzle, but also to predict fertility trends and future social
inequality. In fact, the identification of the patterns of the relationship
between women’s education and childbearing is crucial since it can
have profound consequences on the welfare of a society. First of all, in
an historic moment marked by a rapid expansion of tertiary education,
the fertility behaviour of highly educated women increasingly con-
tributes to determining the national level of fertility (Bavel & Różańska-
Putek, 2010). Second, since educational attainment is an accurate re-
flection of the opportunities and resources available to individuals, a
marked (smoothed) educational gradient of fertility can lead to re-
inforce (weaken) issues of social stratification for the succeeding gen-
eration (Kravdal & Rindfuss, 2008).
Social scientists have examined several institutional aspects to grasp
insights into the cross-country variation in the educational fertility
differentials of women. Since education mirrors specific attitudes, op-
portunity and constraints, the idea is that the effects of institutional
factors on fertility quantum are likely to be heterogeneous by women’s
level of education.
A large number of scholars have focused their analyses on family
policies as instruments for reducing work-family conflicts (Janus, 2013;
Stier, Lewin-Epstein, & Braun, 2012), showing that childcare provision
(Gustafsson & Stafford, 1994), financial transfers (Gauthier & Hatzius,
1997) and parental leave entitlements (Ray, Gornick, & Schmitt, 2010)
play a crucial role in decreasing the steepness of the educational
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gradient of fertility (Thévenon, 2011). However, some researchers have
called into question the validity of these conclusions. The argument that
family policies are crucial for a reduction of the educational gradient in
fertility does not succeed in offering a persuasive explanation for the
weakening of the educational gap experienced by countries offering
minimal state support to families (i.e. the United States; Vos, 2009).
To date, few comparative studies have comprehensively explored
whether other institutional factors are more salient in this regard
(Klesment, Puur, Rahnu, & Sakkeus, 2014). Even if scholars (e.g. Adsera,
2011a, 2011b), have shown that fertility rates are associated with labour
market settings, it is not clear whether this association is multi-
dimensional ways likely to lead to heterogeneity in fertility outcomes
across social strata. Moreover, the analysis of the influence on the gra-
dient has overlooked the role of other macro factors such as cultural
orientations – despite the recognition of some scholars (e.g. Sullivan,
Billari, & Altintas, 2014) that socially-shared values are essential in ex-
plaining the association between education and reproductive choices.
The main novelty of this study lies in the effort to comprehend what
kind of factors (labour market factors, normative climate, etc.) exacerbate
or flatten the negative association between female education and com-
pleted fertility. In particular, this article seeks to make both a theoretical
and empirical contribution. First, we will critically discuss the most re-
levant theoretical models that attempt to explain the cross-country var-
iation of the educational gradient in fertility. Existing theories offer com-
peting explanations. On one side, the New Home Economics framework
conceptualizes institutional factors as the most relevant determinants of
such variation. From another standpoint, proponents of the post-modernist
variant of the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) theory and the
Multiple Equilibrium model argue that the crux of the matter lies in cul-
tural heritage. More specifically, the post-modernist variant of the SDT
theory predicts that it is the degree of diffusion of values nurturing secu-
larization and individualism that shapes the gradient (van de Kaa, 2001).
The Multiple Equilibrium model, instead, assumes that the most powerful
predictor of the educational gap is the level of adherence to gender-neutral
attitudes (Esping-Andersen & Billari, 2015). One limitation of these fra-
meworks is that they offer univocal expectations about the role of con-
textual factors on parity transitions. Recent studies (e.g. Billingsley &
Ferrarini, 2014; Impicciatore & Dalla Zuanna, 2017) have emphasized,
however, that disentangling the complex link between education and
fertility involves identifying the influence of contextual variables based on
family birth order in families. In order to address this gap in the literature,
we will try to enrich the predictions of the three theoretical frameworks.
Specifically, we will consider the role of interactions between macro
characteristics and women’s educational level for each parity.
Second, we will empirically analyse the relationship between edu-
cational attainment and completed fertility, applying a sort of condi-
tional-sequential perspective to fertility decision-making (e.g. Nitsche,
Matysiak, Van Bavel, & Vignoli, 2018) that helps to estimate how societal
factors are associated to female educational gradient by specific parity.
Our cross-sectional study, employing data from the European Social
Survey Round 2 and 3 for 2004 and for 2006, the European Value Study for
2008-9 and the World Value Survey for 2005/2009, includes several
countries of the European Union. Doing that, we are able to exploit a re-
levant contextual heterogeneity in terms of family dynamics, employment
regulation and cultural heritage. The focus was on women who, during the
selected period, were (almost) at the end of their reproductive career.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: in Section 2 we
provide a review of the existing literature about the main mechanisms
underlying educational differences in fertility decisions. In Sections 3 and
4 we present and discuss our empirical results. We conclude in Section 5.
2. Educational gradient, institutions and values: theoretical
background and hypotheses
Our analysis is grounded in theoretical models that provide insights
into the contextual factors that influence the association between
women’s education and fertility choices. As we will explain in detail
below, while New Home Economics theory emphasizes the role of in-
stitutions (Becker, 1981), the Second Demographic Transition theory
(Lesthaeghe, 1995; van de Kaa, 2001) and the Multiple Equilibrium
framework (Esping-Andersen & Billari, 2015) draw attention to value
change.
2.1. Educational gradient and structural factors: the economic perspective
of the role of labour market institutions
The New Home Economics paradigm (Becker, 1981) posits fertility
to be lower among societal groups with higher opportunity costs of
childcare labour. Under this framework, the opportunity costs of
motherhood are generally expected to be higher for better-educated
women. A recent extension of the argument assumes that effective
costs and benefits of childbearing are influenced by the level of op-
portunities for combining motherhood and employment (e.g. Blossfeld
& Huinink, 1991). Where social and economic institutions ease the
combination of paid work with family duties, the income effect is
likely to dominate the substitution effect, entailing higher ‘pro-family’
orientations of better educated women (e.g. Del Boca, Pasqua, &
Pronzato, 2006). This explains the cross-national variation of the
educational gradient of fertility. The theoretical model is not explicit,
however, about the impact of the institutional context on the educa-
tional gradient across parities. We do think this is an overlooked as-
pect in the literature.
Previous studies on the link between regulatory aspects of the la-
bour market and the educational gradient of fertility (e.g. Begall &
Mills, 2011) have mainly focused on the level of employment oppor-
tunities and the degree of working-time flexibility – leaving other
crucial factors only partly addressed. In this paper, we focus on three
key elements of labour market regulation: the availability of part-time
jobs, the size of public sector employment and the degree of rigidity of
the employment protection legislation (EPL).
We are aware that the study of higher order parities may be
subject to self-selection issues. In fact, women at different parities
could vary across a range of unobserved characteristics, such as fa-
mily preferences, that might potentially be associated with fertility
choices (and thus number of children). Moreover, similar unobserved
components may explain the educational level attained – women
with stronger family preferences may typically invest less in educa-
tion (Gottard, Mattei, & Vignoli, 2015). This, in turn, can reduce the
import of the macro-context as a factor in women’s fertility deci-
sions.
2.1.1. Part-time work
Several policymakers have considered part-time work as a strategy
to promote the reconciliation between motherhood and female labour
force participation (Schmitt, 2012). In particular, a stream of the so-
cioeconomic literature has observed that part-time employment is a
contractual form that enables mothers to successfully combine work
and family duties while maintaining career opportunities and income
(e.g. Begall & Mills, 2011). According to this perspective, a higher
prevalence of part-time opportunities lessens work-family conflicts be-
cause it reduces the general rigidity of working-time schedules, thus not
‘forcing’ women to decide between full-time employment and exclusion
from the labour market (Gornick & Heron, 2006). A number of studies
suggest that part-time is especially crucial in improving work-family
balance for those women who have at least one child, given they are
more likely to experience the issue of ‘time squeeze’ related to family
responsibilities (e.g. Begall & Mills, 2011). And among mothers, the
reduction of work-time is likely to be particularly favourable for those
with higher education, since part-time schedule alleviates the issue of
incompatibility between a higher work attachment and family duties
(Gutiérrez-Domènech, 2008). Following this reasoning, one can expect
that, in countries characterised by a high prevalence of part time work,
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the educational gradient of parity progression to second and third birth
will be narrow.1
Some scholars are sceptical about this argument (e.g. Del Boca et al.,
2006). Their criticism concerns the assumption that it is the quantitative
amount of opportunities for part-time work that enhances fertility. In-
stead, they argue, since part-time jobs are often associated with un-
favourable working conditions (Kalleberg, 2000), the key factor is not
the quantity itself but the quality of such position (in terms of protection,
earnings and social benefits). Other studies (e.g. Walsh, 2007) also show
that the promotion of part-time opportunities per se can represent a
policy response to family-work conflicts that may not be attractive for
more highly educated women. Part-time jobs or reducing working hours
may offer limited prospects for career advancement. Moreover, eliciting
employers’ perception of lower work commitment can even produce a
stigmatizing effect that may translate into career penalties (Walsh, 2007)
– part-time work is often indicated as a ‘female-typed’ contractual form
that leads to the so-called ‘mommy track’. It follows that a high avail-
ability of part-time jobs can lead to promote a male breadwinner/female
part-time career model (Dieckhoff, Gash, Mertens, & Gordo, 2016; Pfau-
Effinger, 2005) based on the idea that the wife, regardless of her income
potential, is the second earner. Under such conditions, women with more
education may be compelled to choose between having a part-time
contract and motherhood on the one hand, and keeping valuable full-
time positions and remaining childless on the other (Del Boca et al.,
2006).2 Thus, one could expect that higher educated women, in order to
safeguard their educational investments, are more likely to opt for
childlessness in those societies with a high availability of part-time jobs.
2.1.2. Public sector employment
Public sector jobs have usually been identified as an effective in-
strument for reducing the opportunity costs of motherhood (Adsera,
2004). The empirical evidence generally shows that women working in
the public sector, compared with those in the private sector, benefit from
higher levels of job stability, more protection against unemployment,
considerable flexibility in time schedules and lower pressure when taking
long parental leaves (e.g. Rønsen & Skrede, 2010). Public sector work
also goes hand-in-glove with classical female fields, such as teaching and
healthcare, where supportive work-family culture is prevalent (Begall &
Mills, 2013). Thus, public sector employment has been considered a valid
instrument to compensate for the costs of raising a child (Gutiérrez-
Domènech, 2008). Socioeconomic literature has also shown that, in
countries with larger public sectors, fertility rates are higher (Mandel &
Semyonov, 2006) and parity transitions are faster (Baizán, 2007). The
size of public service sector is expected to have implications also for the
link between education and fertility (Mandel & Semyonov, 2006).
Countries characterised by labour markets with a high availability of
public sector work generally have a higher demand of white collar and
service jobs. This indicates that, there, highly-educated women may have
more opportunities to work in organisations that guarantee a balance
between a (semi)professional career and childbearing (Martin Garcia &
Castro-Martin, 2013). Scholars have also demonstrated that an increase
of occupations in the public sector provides highly educated women
better opportunities for holding authority positions (e.g. Rosenfeld, Van
Buren, & Kalleberg, 1998). Given that state employment traditionally
evolves in tandem with the provision of public services, an ‘extended’
public sector is also likely to offer a crucial support to career-oriented
women in terms of homecare and childcare provision (Esping-Andersen,
1999). All these wide-ranging effects are likely to strengthen women’s
power within the household and within a society-at-large (Bianchi,
Casper, & Peltola, 1999) and to create a supportive environment for
work-family reconciliation – especially for women with college educa-
tion (Stier & Yaish, 2008). Thus, one could expect that the availability of
public employment eases the transition to higher-order parities of better-
educated mothers. As in the case of parental leave benefits (Lalive &
Zweimüller, 2009), the improvement it provides to family-work balance
is likely to be especially crucial for women with more education who
already have a child. It is important to keep in mind that a selection
effect could be at work here because such women could assign a higher
value to the work-family balance associated with public employment.
There is no lack of critical voices regarding the beneficial role of
public employment on fertility. The key argument of the so-called welfare
state paradox is that labour markets with an extensive public sector, while
offering better opportunities for combining work and family duties, also
trigger female occupational segregation and gender wage gap (Charles &
Grusky, 2004; Gornick & Jacobs, 1998). Given that public sector em-
ployment is generally characterised by wage compression and limited
career prospects, in a context characterised by a substantial availability
of such positions, highly educated women may be motivated to compete
with men for more lucrative and qualified careers in the private sector
(Mandel & Semyonov, 2006). In such a context, however, private em-
ployers could be hesitant to hire or to promote mothers to the managerial
level. In fact, they are willing to incur significant non-wage costs related
to family-friendly employment practices, as may be legally supported
(e.g. extremely generous maternity leave; Gangl & Ziefle, 2009; Mandel
& Semyonov, 2006). This, in turn, could have a potentially adverse effect
on labour market prospects and attainments of better-educated women
(Evertsson et al., 2009) – that may face a starker either/or dilemma
between a good job and motherhood. These consequences should allow
the persistence of a negative gradient especially for higher order births,
given the potential higher losses for better educated women in terms of
career development associated with second and higher births.
2.1.3. Strictness of EPL
A brunch of the literature has predicted a negative association be-
tween the level of EPL and fertility rates (Brinton & Lee, 2016; Rovny,
2011). The reasoning is that rigid EPL deters employers from offering
highly regulated permanent positions (also during economic upturns),
while it increases incentives to hire new entrants under temporary
contracts (Bellani & Bosio, 2019; Dolado, García-Serrano, & Jimeno,
2002). Under these circumstances, it would be more difficult for young
women (and men) to become fully integrated into safe and permanent
work positions – usually held by the ‘core workers’, mainly male
middle-aged employees (Boeri & Garibaldi, 2007). As such, labour
markets characterised by strict EPL are expected to increase the costs of
setting up an independent household, thus resulting in a general de-
pressive effect on fertility (Matysiak & Węziak-Białowolska, 2016).3
Some scholars have documented that a certain level of EPL does not
necessarily bring to an equal distribution of labour market risks across
educational classes. Thus, educational groups may experience a het-
erogeneous impact on fertility even if they are subjected to the same
labour market legislation (Wood et al., 2014). In strict EPL settings,
both low and high-educated women (and men) typically enter into the
labour market with temporary contracts; contractual instability,
1 Only a few women have three or more children in the countries we consider:
if they are selected to for high fertility preferences, they may tend to prefer a
part-time instead than a full-time job and to have a third child.
2 Part time contracts that guarantee job protection and suitable income may
reduce the mismatch between career opportunities of higher educated women’s
and their family obligations. In our analysis, because of data limitations, we are
not able to take into account the quality of part time jobs.
3 Scholars have also pointed out that in rigid labour markets young people are
more likely to live longer with their parents as an insurance against labour
market risks (Wolbers, 2007), provoking a postponement of partnering and
parenthood (Fogli, 2004) that may lower the final number of children. Recent
studies show that high EPL are generally associated with a segmentation of
work-based social protection schemes that often denies the access to income
protection programs and to family benefits for young couples (Palier and
Martin, 2007). Even though distinct, these channels are mutually reinforcing
and may hinder fertility aspirations and realizations (Vignoli et al., 2012).
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however, may represent only a temporary stage of the working career of
better-educated workers (Mills & Blossfeld, 2013). Thus, under these
circumstances, highly educated women may just postpone their fertility
plans. Instead, since less educated women are more likely to be en-
trapped in unstable jobs at the labour market periphery (Casquel &
Cunyat, 2005), motherhood is likely to be enduringly less affordable for
low-educated women. One likewise can expect that, in contexts char-
acterised by a rigid labour market regulation, the educational gradient
in parity progressions is less negative, especially in the case of higher
parities – given that, in this case, households have more individuals
without income.
On the opposite, one strain of research hypothesises a positive as-
sociation between the strictness of EPL and fertility realizations (e.g.
Prifti & Vuri, 2013). The argument here is the following: since rigid EPL
makes it more difficult to fire workers from permanent jobs (Garibaldi
& Violante, 2005), it ultimately induces a general perception of income
security. This, in turn, should positively affect the likelihood of having a
(additional) child. Following the same reasoning, flexible employment
legislation, characterised by marginal protection against unemploy-
ment, could preclude the realization of reproductive intentions
(Kreyenfeld, 2009). Regarding the impact on educational groups, a
flexible labour market regulation could widen educational differentials
in childbearing, bringing a reduction of fertility among women with
college education and a rise among the less educated. The reason is
that, in labour markets characterised by flexible EPL, better educated
women – being generally more career-oriented – are motivated to
preserve their labour attachment so as to protect their progress to a
permanent position. Under these circumstances, they could perceive
raising a child as too costly (Liefbroer & Corijn, 1999; Wood et al.,
2014) thus opting for a smaller family size (limiting transitions to
second and subsequent births). In low EPL settings, motherhood may be
perceived by less educated women as an ‘alternative career’ and a
strategic choice to structure an uncertain life course (Hurrelmann,
2003). This expectation refers especially to higher order births. Instead,
in contexts with high EPL the educational gradient should disappear.
2.2. Attitudes, gender values and family size: the cultural perspective
The post-modernist variant of the SDT theory and the Multiple
Equilibrium Model identify the educational gradient of fertility as a result
of values and attitudes more than a product of ‘institutional packages’–
that solely design specific structures of opportunities and constraints for
parents (Saraceno & Keck, 2008). Accordingly, whether the female
educational gradient is negative or not depends on incentives or penalties
determined by cultural factors associated with values and orientations
(Granrose & Kaplan, 1994; Liefbroer & Corijn, 1999).
2.2.1. Post-modernist variant of SDT
The proponents of SDT theory claim that fertility behaviour is strongly
related to the level of diffusion of post-modernist values and attitudes. The
main proposition here is that individuals who embrace individualistic
values perceive childbearing as an outcome of a planned decision (care-
fully taken), rather than a social obligation (van de Kaa, 2001). A decline
in family commitment and the end of the ‘child-king status’, parallel to the
diffusion of post-modernist values, are thus predicted.
Although adherents to the ideational theory have not explicitly
elaborated a theoretical model on the impact of education on fertility
behaviour, they implicitly assume that high education embodies a shift
away from traditional values (Lesthaeghe, 2010). This is because levels
of educational attainment reflect different learning processes of post-
modernist values (Inglehart, 1997).4 Hence, highly educated women
are identified as frontrunners of new attitudes such as autonomy and
self-realisation (Lesthaeghe, 1995, van de Kaa, 2001). As such, they are
expected to spearhead opposition to religious institutions and to pro-
traditional family behaviour (Lesthaeghe, 2010). This, in turn, should
result in a significative limitation of family size.5 In a second step all
other educational classes are expected to embrace these family pre-
ferences and fertility behaviours.6
Like Becker’s framework, the basic formulation of the ideational
theory lacks an explicit prediction about the cross-country variation of
the educational gradient in fertility. However, it implicitly assumes that
the international variation depends on the degree of diffusion of post-
modernist attitudes at country level (Merz & Liefbroer, 2012; Sobotka,
2008). Accordingly, the dampening effect of (female) high education on
fertility is predicted to be heterogeneous across countries, stronger
where the diffusion process of new norms is at early stage of diffusion,
and weaker where post-modernism has gained a dominant status
(Perelli-Harris & Lyons-Amos, 2016; Sobotka, 2008).7 It is not clear,
however, whether this effect is more salient for the first or higher pa-
rities. Nonetheless, one could expect that in countries with a low degree
of diffusion of post-modernist values, highly educated women are less
likely to progress to second and higher parities, compared to their lower
educated counterpart. Instead, where the diffusion of post-modernism
has reached a large proportion of the population, fertility patterns
might be similar across educational groups.
2.2.2. Multiple equilibrium
A contrasting theoretical model, the Multiple Equilibrium frame-
work, elaborated by Esping-Andersen and Billari (2015), affirms that,
under some circumstances, female human capital is positively asso-
ciated with fertility. One of the key factors distinguishing this theory to
post-modernist variant of SDT is the importance attributed to what
Esping-Andersen and Billari (2015) call the gender equity dividend. The
authors theorise that fertility behaviour is crucially influenced by the
degree to which a society adopts gender equitable attitudes; this, in
turn, is expected to shape the educational divide in family size (Esping-
Andersen, 2009).
A principal tenet of the Multiple Equilibrium framework, that de-
velops further the ideas of McDonald (2000a), 2000b, McDonald, 2006,
about a U-shaped relationship between gender equity and fertility is
that there are different stages of diffusion of gender-egalitarian values
(and behaviours). These comprise traditional kinship, unstable equili-
brium and gender egalitarian dominance (Esping-Andersen & Billari,
2015). The three stages are characterised by a different educational
gradient of fertility. The key lies in the positive association between
gender egalitarian societies and gender-equal opportunities (Arpino,
Esping-Andersen, & Pessin, 2015). In traditional societies, characterised
by a strict gender specialisation, and in gender-egalitarian societies,
where the adoption of gender egalitarian practices has become uni-
versal, the gradient is expected to be null or even reversed (positive).
This is because in countries dominated by male breadwinner-female
housewife model, education should not act as a barrier to childbearing.
In such societies, the dominance of gender specialisation and pro-family
orientation attains normative hegemony across all the educational le-
vels (Bellani, Esping-Andersen, & Nedoluzhko, 2017). Therefore, the
opportunity costs of childbearing are likely to be low across all edu-
cational groups. In parallel, in contexts characterised by high diffusion
of gender-egalitarian norms, high- and low- educated women are ex-
pected to have similar fertility realizations because it is relatively more
feasible for women to combine family duties and career – even for those
4 Demographic studies have acknowledged that values associated with post
materialism and the SDT are strongly correlated with high education (e.g.
Perelli‐Harris et al 2010).
5 The so called Maslowian drift (Zaidi and Morgan, 2017).
6 Higher educated women are expected to be less susceptible to normative
influence (Liefbroer and Billari, 2010).
7 In other words, the higher the diffusion the lower the fertility gap between
educational groups.
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facing steep opportunity costs of motherhood. The reason is that high
diffusion of egalitarian norms related to the gender division of domestic
work makes more compatible working and having children (Arpino
et al., 2015; Goldscheider, Bernhardt, & Lappegård, 2015). In contrast,
where there is only a partial support for the ‘gender-egalitarian’ family
model, women – especially those who are highly educated – should
experience severe constraints in reconciling family and work because of
the lack of male adaptation to new roles for women. Hence, for those
societies where gender norms in the private sphere (but not in the
public) remain resistant to change, Multiple Equilibrium theory pre-
dicts a negative gradient.8 This argument does not take into con-
sideration, however, that the moderator role of gender egalitarianism
may vary according to specific parity progression. Gender egalitar-
ianism should play a crucial role, especially in the case of higher-order
births, since the family-career balance is generally more difficult to
achieve after the first birth (Luppi, 2016; Matysiak, Mencarini, &
Vignoli, 2016). Thus, one could predict that the educational gradient
becomes especially marked in the progression toward higher-order
births in those countries that fit the unstable equilibrium framework.
3. Data, variables and methodology
We combined three different datasets, European Social Survey (ESS)
2004/2005 (Round 2) and 2006/7 (Round 3), World Value Survey
(WVS) 2005/2009 and European Value Study (EVS) 2008/9. Since all
the three surveys are characterised by a set of comparable variables
across all countries, we pool the three datasets.9 Doing so, we obtain
larger national samples that ease cross-country comparisons between
sub-groups broken down by individual characteristics such as educa-
tion. Although ESS, WVS and EVS data are cross-sectional, the selected
waves collect information about women’s completed fertility – this in-
formation is not available in more recent rounds of the surveys.10
We employed all the European countries when it was found possible
to gather information on crucial independent variables at micro-level
and to collect contextual variables (at country-cohort level). For these
reasons, we select a sample of 24 European countries. Since we are
interested in completed fertility indicators, we restrict our analyses to
the sub-sample of women aged 42–57 born between 1950 and 1963,
whose fertility histories are broadly completed.11 We split the sample in
two cohorts, women born between 1950 and 1956 and women born
between 1957 and 1963 since the two cohorts of women were em-
bedded in (partly) different socio-economic contexts during their life
course.12 Indeed, the contextual features that we take into considera-
tion do not only vary by country but also by cohort; hence our approach
exploits both variations across countries and across cohorts. Doing so,
we consider two levels since individuals are nested in country-cohort
combinations (two level-units). As a result, we have 45 country-cohort
units. A list of these units is provided in the Appendix (Table A1).13
We conduct our analysis comparing women at different parities –
the samples pool individuals at higher parities to maximize the sample.
3.1. Individual variables
We focus on woman’s parity, defined as the number of children a
woman has ever borne. Similarly to previous studies (Barakat &
Durham, 2013; Nisén, Martikainen, Kaprio, & Silventoinen, 2013;
Nisén, Martikainen, Silventoinen, & Myrskylä, 2014), we consider three
dependent variables: parity 1 or higher versus childlessness (having at
least one child or not having children), parity 2 or higher versus parity
1 (having more than one child or having one) and parity 3 or higher
versus parity 2 (having more than two children or having two children).
We label the first dummy variable as P1+, the second as P2+ and the
third as P3 + . In our study these dummies were constructed using the
variable total “number of children” collected in all the datasets, with
the only exception of ESS Round 2. In this case we derived the variable
adding together the number of children that moved out of the re-
spondent’s house with the number of children that were living in the
respondent’s house.14
We use the highest educational level attained by women at the time
of the interview as explanatory variable. We reduced the detailed in-
formation existing in the data regarding the respondent’s level of edu-
cation to three categories, a) lower secondary education or less, that
represents the level 0–2 of the International Standard Classification of
Education 1997 (ISCED from now on), b) upper secondary non-tertiary
education (ISCED 3–4) and c) tertiary education (ISCED 5–6) - as
standard practice for European studies on educational gradient in fer-
tility choices. We label the first category as low education, the second as
medium education and the third as high education.15
We include, at the individual level, three control variables, the age
of the respondent (to adjust for the length of time a woman was at risk
of having an additional child), a categorical variable to identify the
surveys, and a dummy for the respondent’s birth cohort.16
Descriptive statistics about individual-level variables are reported in
Table 1.
3.2. Macro-level variables
We consider key-factors to identify the extent to which labour
market regulation and the attitudinal orientations are associated with
fertility realizations. We construct contextual variables at country level
that refer to the period 1989-96 for the respondents of the first cohort
and 1997–2005 for those of the second cohort (country-cohort
8 Bellani et al. (2017) show that this is the case for the likelihood of being in a
marriage or cohabitation.
9 Previous studies have already used these data sources in order to study
parity-specific fertility or fertility quantum (Huijts et al., 2011, Kalwij, 2010).
However, a limitation is that the number of children declared should include
not only respondents’ biological children but also step, adopted, foster or
partner’s children.
10 We are aware that the period considered includes 2008 and 2009, years
when the economic crisis started. However, its effect in the ‘real economy’
became evident since 2009-2010. Since we consider in our analysis only com-
pleted fertility, we are confident that our results are not biased.
11 We decide to select this age interval because we want to study the asso-
ciation between completed fertility and some contextual measures that are
available only for this specific segment of the population. Moreover we want to
avoid inaccuracy in the information due to memory lapses on the total number
of children. As robustness check, we select also women aged 45-60. Results do
not change (analysis upon request).
12 For Estonia, Bulgaria and Slovenia data are available for one cohort, only.
13 We replicate the same analysis with three levels in the multi-level analysis,
individuals, country-periods and country. Results are pretty similar (analysis
upon request).
14 ESS Round 3, WVS of 2005-2009 and EVS of 2008-9 contains a question
about the total number of children of the respondent, while for the ESS Round 2
the variable on the total number of children has been reconstructed. For ESS
Round 2 we add the number of children of the respondent that do not live in the
household to the number of children that live in the household. To check
whether there are significant differences between the two waves of ESS within
countries we implement a statistical test (T test) to assess whether the means of
the number of children of the two datasets by countries are statistically dif-
ferent from each other. This is not the case, with the exception of France and
Hungary for the first cohort considered and Austria, Poland and Slovakia for the
second cohort. As “Robustness checks” we provide test excluding these coun-
tries from the ESS Round 2.
15 An important caveat is that this variable captures the situation at the time
of the interview; however, it is possible that a share of the completed fertility
was realized while she was in a different educational group.
16 One limitation of our model is that we are not able to control for the
marriage history of the individual. Another limitation is the lack of data on
children’s ages.
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variables).17 This is because we assign values of the macro-indicators
that can capture contextual conditions to women during their 30′s, a
life stage when key decisions about fertility choices are done – such as
taking the decision to forgo children or whether to “catch-up” the
postponement of conception.18 Detailed definition and description of
macro variables are reported in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. Note that
if we did not allow the contextual indicators to vary between country
and cohort, we would not capture the variation of the contextual in-
dicators across cohorts, thus limiting our ability to identify contextual
influence.
In order to depict the configuration of the labour market regulation
at country-level, we include three indicators.
The first one is the availability of female part-time employment
calculated as the share of women working part-time out of the total
number of female working population - retrieved by the OECD
Statistical Database. It assumes small values (from about 2%–10%) in
Eastern European countries to more than 50 % in the Netherlands. In
some cases, such as Denmark, Norway and Sweden, we observe a
considerable variation between cohorts (Table 3).
The second indicator is the prevalence of women in public em-
ployment operationalized as the percentage of women employed in the
public sector over all the employed women - retrieved by the UNECE
Statistical database. As we can observe from Table 3, there is a relevant
country variation - from 10 to 12% in Turkey to more than 60 % in
Table 1
Description of the individual-level variables, pooled dataset.
P1+ vs 0 child P2+ vs 1 child P3+ vs 2 children
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Parities
Parity 87.24 % 79.14 % 41.37 %
Lower parity 12.76 % 20.86 % 58.63 %
Age 49.23 4.24 42 57 49.25 4.25 42 57 49.26 4.25 42 57
Education
Low 31.26 % 32.30 % 33.16 %
Medium 43.09 % 43.07 % 42.46 %
High 25.65 % 24.63 % 24.37 %
Dataset
ESS 62.05 % 61.35 % 60.90 %
EVS 28.61 % 29.15 % 29.50 %
WVS 9.35 % 9.50 % 9.60 %
Birth-cohort
1950-56 44.77 % 44.63 % 44.82 %
1957-63 55.23 % 55.37 % 55.18 %
N 15524 13587 10753
Table 2
Macro-level determinants of parities: definition and sources.
Macro level determinant Indicator Measurement Source
Access to part time employment for
women
Proportion of women working part-
time
Part time employment as percentage of the total employment of women aged
25–54.
OECD
Access to public sector employment
for women
Proportion of women in public
employment
Female public employment as a percentage of all employed women. UNECE
Flexibility of labour market Rigidity of employment protection
legislation
Index of EPL on regular workers. OECD
Post-modernist attitudes Diffusion of “non-traditional” attitudes % of respondents aged 15–55 that declare that religion is not important in life. EVS and WVS.
Gender egalitarian attitudes in the
labour market
Diffusion of gender egalitarian attitudes % of respondents aged 15–55 that disagree or strongly disagree with the
statement “When job are scarce men should have more right to a job than
women”.
EVS and WVS
HDI Human Development Index Summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human




Weighted maternal leave weeks Sum of weeks of maternity leave
weighted
Number of weeks of maternal leave weighted by level of cash benefits. ILO
Gross enrolment rate in pre-primary Gross enrolment rate in pre-primary
school
% of children enrolled in pre-primary school over the total of children of the
same age. Note that this indicator can exceed 100 % due to the inclusion of
over-aged and under-aged pupils/students, therefore causing a discrepancy
between the numerator and denominator of this index.
UNESCO
Total family benefits Public expenditure for family benefits
as % of GDP
% of GDP for family benefits. OECD
Female participation rate Rate of female participation in the
labour market
% of women that are active in the labour market (employed and unemployed). ILO
Life-long singlehood rate for
women
Rate of women that have never married
or cohabiting until the age of 40
% of life long single women (birth cohorts 1950-56 and 1957–1963) ESS and EVS
17 We are compelled to estimate with a cohort dummy rather than a con-
tinuous age specification since for many countries we do not have more than
one observation by cohort on (one or more) variables at aggregate level.
18 We do not have enough information on main relevant variables when the
selected women were in their 20s.
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics of macro-level variables, %, and rank order of countries-cohort by macro-level variable.
Part time prevalence Public sector prevalence Strictness of EPL on regular workers Post modernism indicator Gender egalitarianism approval
First cohort Second cohort First cohort Second cohort First cohort Second cohort First cohort Second cohort First cohort Second cohort
AT 24.40 (26) 28.68(31) . 18.00 (6) 2.75 (34) 2.62 (29) 46.81 (10) 51.60 (14) 49.21 (7) 61.97 (15)
BE 34.61 (35) 35.73 (38) 24.15 (13) 30.47 (17) 1.85 (8) 1.87 (9) 59.94 (18) 58.83 (17) 57.47 (10) 77.41 (32)
CH 46.80 (43) 46.51 (42) 18.10 (7) 20.73(9) 1.60 (5) 1.60 (6) 60.86 (19) . 60.83 (14) .
CZ 3.56 (4) 3.54 (2) 57.15 (36) 29.80 (16) 3.31 (42) 3.31 (43) 81.90 (42) 85.24 (44) 43.66 (5) 63.71 (18)
DE 31.24 (33) 36.53 (39) . 16.20 (5) 2.63 (30) 2.68 (32) 74.26 (36) 78.11 (39) 65.69 (20) 65.47 (19)
DK 21.14 (22) 15.80 (19) . 48.62 (34) 2.16 (14) 2.13 (13) 75.90 (37) 78.62 (40) 93.37 (42) 93.01 (40)
EE . 6.45 (7) 61.40 (37) 34.95 (24) 2.90 (39) 2.74 (33) 80.50 (41) 84.45 (43) 52.35 (9) 76.77 (31)
ES 12.59 (15) 16.06 (20) 21.35 (10) 20.05 (8) 3.15 (41) 2.36 (22) 54.29 (18) 63.16 (24) 67.72 (22) 71.38 (25)
FI 7.83 (9) 8.96 (11) 40.05 (29) 4.03 (28) 2.55 (28) 1.99 (10) 63.28 (26) 64.36 (28) 76.74 (30) 88.18 (37)
FR 22.79 (23) 23.33 (24) 31.60 (20) 30.50 (18) 2.34 (20) 2.38 (24) 64.18 (27) 68.71 (32) 63.22 (17) 72.26 (27)
GB 40.76 (41) 36.78 (40) 31.55 (19) 31.80 (21) 1.10 (1) 1.21 (2) 62.12 (23) 64.68 (29) 73.10 (28) 84.18 (35)
GR 13.86 (18) 12.43 (14) 22.35(11) 23.68(12) 2.80 (36) 2.80 (37) . 33.40 (8) . 74.82 (29)
HU . 3.84 (6) . 36.55 (25) 2.00 (11) 2.00 (12) 63.19 (25) 67.76 (31) 59.28 (11) 60.61 (13)
IE 26.68 (27) 32.21 (34) . 29.60 (15) 1.44 (3) 1.44 (4) 21.02 (5) 31.78 (6) 66.95 (21) 82.90 (34)
IS 35.33 (37) 27.19 (28) . 45.60 (31) . 1.73 (7) 50.62 (13) 50.13 (12) 93.11 (41) 95.38 (44)
LU 27.57 (29) 31.16 (32) 9.30 (1) 13.42 (4) . 2.25 (16) . 61.14 (20) . 70.10 (24)
NL 55.11 (44) 56.33 (45) . 33.10 (22) 2.96 (40) 2.87 (38) 62.00 (22) 70.04 (33) 77.91 (33) 89.08 (38)
NO 34.81 (36) 28.64 (30) . 47.45 (32) 2.33 (18) 2.33 (19) 67.00 (30) . 85.16 (36) .
PL 11.30 (13) 13.11 (16) 49.50 (35) 38.62 (27) 2.23 (15) 2.23 (16) 12.93 (3) 19.16 (4) 35.71 (2) 49.76 (8)
PT 13.84 (17) 8.56 (10) . 25.60 (14) 4.69 (46) 4.55 (45) 45.76 (9) 31.93 (7) 59.95 (12) 68.00 (23)
SE 23.51 (25) 17.45 (21) . 47.80 (33) 2.79 (35) 2.35 (21) 76.15 (38) 71.00 (35) 92.79 (39) 95.01 (43)
SI . 3.68 (5) 33.80 (23) 37.67 (26) 3.40 (44) 2.65 (31) 61.15 (21) 70.17 (34) 63.11 (16) 71.48 (26)
SK 3.55 (3) 2.71 (1) 66.45 (38) 40.43 (30) 2.47 (27) 2.40 (26) 57.16 (16) 48.42 (11) 39.07 (3) 47.92 (6)
TR 11.03 (12) 6.64 (8) 9.90 (2) 11.97 (3) 2.39 (25) 2.37 (23) 12.32 (2) 8.65 (1) 39.95 (4) 33.46 (1)
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Fig. 1. Predicted probabilities P1+, P2+ and P3+, by educational level and country-cohort.
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Estonia and Slovakia. Additionally, we observe that it varies between
cohorts especially in Eastern European countries (for obvious reasons).
In order to measure the degree of rigidity of the labour market, the
third indicator is EPL index on regular contracts, as measured by the
OECD (OECD, 1999). In fact, theoretical and empirical studies on the
impact of the EPL have often identified the strictness of EPL for in-
dividual and collective dismissals of permanent workers as the best
proxy of labour market regulation (for a discussion Karabchuk, 2016).19
Overall, the average value is about 2.5, and it is high in Portugal and
low in Anglo-Saxon countries. The cohort-variation within country is
especially clear in Spain and Finland.
The indicator of the level of diffusion of post-modernist orientation
relates to the degree of religiousness at country-cohort level. It identi-
fies the level of secularism, frequently defined as determining process of
the adoption of post-modernist values (Lesthaeghe & Surkyn, 1988).
The gift of the argument here is that people who do not feel religious
commitments are expected to be more oriented toward individual
freedom of choice and, hence, more prompt to assume less conservative
fertility behaviours.20 This indicator is built using the answer to the
question contained in WVS, waves 2, 3 and 4, “how important is in your
life religion?”. We have codified the answers in two categories, “im-
portant” or “not important”. After that, we construct an indicator at the
cohort-country level that represents the percentage of individuals (men
and women) that do not think that religion is important. Doing so, we
are able to (partly) identify a proxy of the proportion of adherents to
post-modernist values for each country-cohort. The lower values are
found in Turkey and Poland (about 20 %), the higher in Estonia (up to
80 %) – country that has experienced an early trend toward secular-
ization (see also Perelli-Harris, 2014). We observe a relevant cohort
variation within country in Ireland, Austria and Spain.
Finally, in order to capture the diffusion of gender egalitarian ideals,
we measure the proportion of people (men and women) that support
gender egalitarian views regarding working women - see Arpino et al.
(2015) and Bellani et al. (2017) for a discussion on the empirical va-
lidation as indicator of gender egalitarianism.21 This indicator derives
from a question contained in EVS, waves 2 and 3, and in WVS, waves 2,
3 and 4. The respondent answers to the question about how much he/















































































































































































































































Fig. 2. Caterpillar plots for country level intercept residuals, first, second, third births hazards.
19 In particular it refers to procedural difficulties (e.g. length of notification
period) and direct costs (severance payments) involved in dismissing perma-
nent workers (Gebel and Giesecke, 2011). It takes also into account restrictions
stemming from legislation, court rulings, collectively-bargained conditions of
employment and customary practice (Venn 2009).
20 This indicator has been validated by previous studies since the level of
(footnote continued)
religiousness constitutes a relevant component of value orientation of the SDT
(Surkyn and Lesthaeghe, 2004)
21 Although we use this variable to capture the degree to which gender ega-
litarianism characterizes any given society, we prefer to label it as 'gender
equity' because it taps notions of fairness.
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more right to a job than women”. Answering categories were then
scaled, with a first category indicating that the respondent disagrees or
strongly disagrees, and the second category indicating if he/she agrees
or strongly agrees or doesn’t disagree with the statement. From this
variable we construct a measure of support for gender egalitarianism as
the percentage of gender egalitarian respondents at country-cohort
level. In our models, this variable is measured in both linear and
quadratic form. We observe in Table 3 that Turkey has the lowest value
(about 36 %) while the highest is found in Iceland (about 95 %).
Austria, Belgium together with France, Hungary and Poland exhibit a
significant variation between cohorts.
In order to disentangle the influence of these factors, we control for
structural and institutional variables at the country-cohort level. For
capturing the generosity of family policies (e.g. Gauthier, 2007, Luci-
Greulich & Thévenon, 2013), we include in our models three indicators
(at country-cohort level), the weighted leave weeks measured as the
total number of weeks of maternity weighted by the average normal net
wages paid during the leave (from ILO Working Conditions Laws Da-
tabase), the total family benefits as percentage of GDP (from OECD
Social Expenditure Database), the gross enrolment to pre-primary
education (from UNESCO). In order to account for economic develop-
ment at country-cohort level, we control also for national Human De-
velopment Index (HDI) – retrieved from the UN Development Depart-
ment. It represents a proxy of the national wealth (Myrskylä, Kohler, &
Billari, 2009) and of the general labour market conditions (United
Nations, 2010). Finally, we control for female participation rate at
country-cohort level (as reported by ILOstat), representing the labour
market opportunities that women face (Adsera, 2011a),22 and, lastly,
for the prevalence of life long singlehood mirroring marriage market
conditions. The construction of this indicator follows the definition
suggested by Bellani et al. (2017) – lifelong singles as individuals that
never ever cohabited or married until 40 years of age – and is based on
our elaboration of ESS data (rounds 1–7) and EVS data (survey 2008).23
3.3. Methodology
Given the codification of the dependent variables and the hier-
archical structure of the data, where individuals are nested within
country-cohorts, we estimate multilevel (random effects) binary logistic
models (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). This methodology permits us to
control (partly) for the correlation of the responses of individuals (first
level) that belong to the same economic and cultural context (second
level). While the first level in the model estimates individual-level
correlates (women’s characteristics) of completed fertility, the second
Table 4
Results of Multilevel logistic regression on having at least one child on individual characteristics and country-cohort level variables. Odds ratios.
Parity 1+ vs 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Age 1.010 1.011 1.011 1.010 1.011 1.011 1.010
(.012) (.012) (.012) (.013) (.012) (.012) -(.012)
Cohort 1.150 1.327** 1.192 1.669*** 1.351** 1.238 1.391***
(.166) (.18) (.162) (.252) (.178) (.163) (.168)
Dataset: ESS (ref.)
EVS 1.102 1.091 1.092 1.094 1.081 1.091 1.090
(.072) (.072) (.072) (.081) (.071) (.072) (.072)
WVS 1.320*** 1.303*** 1.305*** 1.273** 1.300*** 1.310*** 1.326***
(.123) (.122) (.122) (.13) (.121) (.122) (.123)
Educational level: medium (ref.)
Low 1.340*** 1.346*** 1.356*** 1.295*** 1.348*** 1.357*** 1.297***
(.089) (.09) (.09) (.096) (.09) (.091) (.087)
High .717*** .730*** .735*** .701*** .720*** .746*** .718***
(.043) (.044) (.044) (.047) (.043) (.045) (.044)
HDI .973** 0.995 .969*** .969*** 0.985 .937***
(.011) (.014) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.012)
Weighted leave weeks 1.023** 1.017* 1.018** 1.029*** 1.028*** 1.017**
(.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.008)
Total family benefits 0.989 1.046 1.070 0.940 0.937 1.148
(.11) (.109) (.12) (.104) (.098) (.112)
Enrolment pre-primary 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 1.002 1.001
(.003) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Participation rate 1.002 0.998 .988** 1.003 1.010** 1.005
(.004) (.004) (.006) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Life-long single rate .902*** .911*** .918*** .910*** .880*** 0.968
(.026) (.024) (.027) (.026) (.026) (.026)
Proportion of women part-time .989**
(.004)








Gender egalitarianism 2 1.000***
(.000)
Level 2 random-effects variance .132 (.035) .060 (.019) .047 (.016) .034 (.015) 052 (.017) .043 (0.15) .030 (.012)
Observations 15524 15524 15524 12376 15289 15136 15136
Number of groups 45 45 45 36 43 43 43
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
22 Excluding this variable results do not substantially change (results upon
request).
23 Excluding this variable results do not substantially change (results upon
request).
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level of the model, fitting the country-cohorts level correlates, considers
the intra-country-cohort correlation that is not controlled by aggregate
level indicators. The random intercept represents unobserved char-
acteristics that are shared within the individuals of the same second
level unit. We use maximum-likelihood estimation with adaptive
quadrature. As we have already reported, we control for the birth co-
hort by adding fixed effects for cohorts.24
Given that the country-level explanatory variables show, in some
cases, a not negligible degree of correlation (see Appendix Table A2),
we add them one by one in the main model.
4. Findings
4.1. Descriptive results: heterogeneity in the educational gradient of fertility
outcomes
Before turning to the test of the expectations of the theoretical
models, some descriptive results will be discussed. The goal of this
section is to describe the contextual variation in the educational gra-
dient at specific parity. Fig. 1 displays the country-cohort educational
gradient by plotting the estimated predicted probabilities of P1+, P2+
and P3 + . Note that the coefficients are obtained from binary logistic
models that also contain individual controls.
We can observe that there is a substantial variation in the gradient -
and that it varies according to the parity considered. In most of the
countries, better-educated women face lower probabilities associated to
P1+, P2+ and P3+ when compared to those less educated. This is
especially the case for Poland, Greece and Portugal, where the negative
gradient is strong and persistent across parities. However, in other
countries, the negative association appears to be small or null (e.g.
Denmark, Sweden) or it has decreased across cohorts (e.g. Norway and
Germany). At the same time, having an additional child appears to be
less common for the younger cohort of highly educated women in
Switzerland, Spain and Poland. This pattern is also found in Greece and
Slovakia (for the P2+), while it seems the opposite in Austria, Belgium
and Czech Republic (for P1+ and P2+). Also noteworthy are the
Table 5
Results of multilevel logistic regression on having at least two children on individual characteristics and country-cohort level variables. Odds ratios.
Parity 2+ vs 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Age .985 .985 .985 .985 .986 .988 .988
(.010) (.010) (.010) (.011) (.019) (.010) (.010)
Cohort .901 .820 .797 1.076 .800 .697** .798
(.125) (.129) (.135) (.169) (.115) (.101) (.114)
Dataset: ESS (ref.)
EVS 1.121** 1.121** 1.121** 1.093 1.106* 1.128** 1.126**
(.064) (.064) (.064) (.069) (.063) (.065) (.065)
WVS 1.001 .996 .997 1.022 .989 .999 .999
(.079) (.078) (.078) (.089) (.078) (.079) (.078)
Educational level: medium (ref.)
Low 1.282*** 1.283*** 1.284*** 1.275*** 1.298*** 1.285*** 1.267***
(.072) (.073) (.073) (.080) (.075) (.075) (.074)
High .947 .943 .944 .916 .932 .939 .927
(.053) (.053) (.053) (.057) (.052) (.053) (.053)
HDI 1.020 1.025 1.014 1.008 1.043*** 1.016
(.015) (.020) (.012) (.014) (.014) (.018)
Weighted leave weeks .998 .996 .986 1.010 1.013 .997
(.011) (.012) (.009) (.011) (.010) (.010)
Total family benefits .945 .959 1.015 .851 .842 .953
(.136) (.141) (.128) (.113) (.106) (.127)
Enrolment pre-primary .997 .997 .997 .999 1.002 1.001
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Participation rate 1.000 .999 .984** 1.000 1.004 .997
(.005) (.005) (.006) (.005) (.005) (.005)
Life-long single rate .989 .990 .991 .975 .910*** 1.025
(.036) (.036) (.033) (.033) (.032) (.039)
Proportion of women part-time .997
(.006)








Gender egalitarianism 2 1.001***
(.000)
Level 2 random-effects variance .138 (.035) .129 (.033) .128 (.033) .059 (.020) .095 (.026) .084 (.023) .089 (.025)
Observations 13587 13587 13587 10854 13369 13228 13228
Number of groups 45 45 45 36 43 43 43
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
24 We opt for multilevel modelling because it is more appropriate for our
study compared to standard regression analysis. First of all, in multilevel
models the contribution to the log likelihood of each unit at level two is pro-
portional to its size. Hence, since we have an unbalanced data structure, the
choice of multilevel modelling is more appropriate because they can handle
with heterogeneous size of the clusters (Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh, 2004).
Secondly, given that we include a cross-level interaction between education (at
the individual level) and contextual variables, this methodology has the ad-
vantage that it allows the influence of education to vary across country-cohorts.
It implies that we are able to assess the role that education exerts on the like-
lihood of women to have at least one, two or three children as well as to better
understand the contextual factors that underlie fertility behaviour across edu-
cational classes. In this sense, individual controls, country-level indicators to-
gether with their interactions are all treated as independent variables in our
models.
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differences in the gradient within countries. As Fig. 1 reveals, while, in
some regions, the gradient increases with the transition to higher pa-
rities (e.g. Turkey) in others it seems not the case (e.g. France, Spain
and the Netherlands).
Summarizing, over the observed period, European societies do not
exhibit one single pattern in the gradient. Understanding the extent to
which the different strength of the gradient can be explained by in-
stitutional and cultural factors is the challenge of our empirical analysis.
Before presenting the multilevel results, we estimate a baseline model
in order to analyse cross-sectional differences in the likelihood of P1+,
P2+ and P3+ – in this way we are able to measure country-cohort ef-
fects (estimated residuals). Results of this model are represented in Fig. 2.
In these caterpillar plots we show country-cohort residuals that are or-
dered and endowed with 95 % confidence bars (+/- 1.96 the com-
parative standard errors) related to P1+, P2+ and P3+ respectively. We
observe that for a substantial number of country-cohort units, the 95 %
confidence interval does not overlap the horizontal line at zero, in-
dicating that the hazards are significantly above or below the mean.
In particular, considering the first plot (related to P1+), we can see
that Czech Republic, Netherlands and Spain (for different birth cohorts)
are placed in the lowest part of the ranking meaning that, in these so-
cieties, the likelihood of becoming mother is lower than the average while
the opposite is true for Iceland and Turkey (for different birth cohorts) -
that are placed at the top of the plot. Regarding higher parities (P2+), we
can see that the countries ranking high are the Nordic democracies (with
the exception of Finland) along with France, Ireland and Turkey. Finally
Fig. 2 shows that the likelihood of having more than two children (P3+)
is especially lower in Mediterranean countries and Hungary (for different
birth cohorts) and, again, higher for Turkey and Iceland.
4.2. Multilevel results
In the following, the results of the multilevel logistic models for
P1+, P2+ and P3+ are presented. In a first step, P1+, P2+ and P3+
are regressed on individual characteristics. Then we add contextual
variables as well as interaction terms testing the potential moderating
association of institutional and attitudinal factors on the relationship
between women’s education and P1+, P2+ and P3 + . The results of
the regression analyses are presented as odds ratios (OR) together with
their standard errors. As already explained, when interpreting parity
progression, one should keep in mind unobserved differences between
women at different parities as well as the relationship between family
preferences and educational level attained.
In Model 1, Table 4,5 and 6, where we add individual level variables
to the null model, we find a salient and significant influence of women’s
education (in line with previous literature). Women in the lower edu-
cational category show a greater likelihood of having an additional
child compared to their high-educated counterpart. The predicted
probability for women with low education of having at least one child is
about 93 % while it is less than 84 % for highly educated. In the case of
Table 6
Results of multilevel logistic regression on having at least three children on individual characteristics and country-cohort level variables. Odds ratios.
Parity 3+ vs 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Age 0.996 0.996 .996 .988 .994 .995 .995
(.009) (.009) (.009) (.010) (.009) (.009) (.009)
Cohort .845 .921 1.014 1.005 .927 .744* .857
(.137) (.170) (.199) (.217) (.144) (.130) (.138)
Dataset: ESS (ref.)
EVS .947 .947 .946 .993 .941 .956 .954
(.051) (.051) (.051) (.060) (.051) (.052) (.052)
WVS .916 .914 .913 .943 .914 .915 .917
(.067) (.066) (.066) (.076) (.066) (.067) (.067)
Educational level: medium (ref.)
Low 1.486*** 1.486*** 1.484*** 1.541*** 1.494*** 1.479*** 1.461***
(.077) (.077) (.077) (.089) (.078) (.078) (.078)
High .959 .961 .961 .975 .956 .967 .956
(.052) (.052) (.052) (.060) (.052) (.053) (.052)
HDI 1.001 .981 1.005 .989 1.027 .990
(.018) (.022) (.017) (.015) (.017) (.020)
Weighted leave weeks .977* .982 .980 .995 .991 .975**
(.013) (.014) (.013) (.012) (.013) (.011)
Total family benefits 1.123 1.069 1.168 .974 .951 1.125
(.196) (.188) (.217) (.145) (.153) (.177)
Enrolment pre-primary .999 .999 .996 .998 1.003 1.002
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.003) (.004) (.003)
Participation rate 1.000 1.004 .989 1.000 1.003 .996
(.006) (.007) (.009) (.005) (.006) (.005)
Life-long single rate .976 .970 .976 .989 .906** 1.045
(.043) (.042) (.047) (.037) (.041) (.046)
Proportion of women part-time 1.010
(.008)








Gender egalitarianism 2 1.001***
(.000)
Level 2 random-effects variance .231 (.056) .209 (.051) .201 (.049) .162 (.045) .129 (.033) .157 (.040) .138 (.035)
Observations 10753 10753 10753 8579 10592 10480 10480
Number of groups 45 45 45 36 43 43 43
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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P2+, it is about 83 % and 77 % for low and high educated women
respectively, while in the case of P3+ the gap increases - the predicted
probability is 48 % for low educated and 38 % for high educated.
In order to explore the overall association between the contextual
level indicators and P1+, P2+ and P3+, we add to our model the
variables at country-cohort level (Table 4,5 and 6). More specifically,
we add to the individual variables the controls at country-cohort level
(Model 2) and then, one by one, the country-cohort indicators in which
we are interested in - the proportion of female part-time employment
(Model 3), the share of female public employment (Model 4), the EPL
index (Model 5), the degree of diffusion of post-modernist values
(Model 6) and the proportion of people supporting egalitarian attitudes
Table 7
Results of multilevel logistic regression on having at least one child on individual characteristics and country-cohort level variables interactions. Odds ratios.
Parity 1+ vs 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Age 1.011 1.009 1.010 1.010 1.010
(.0115) (.013) (.011) (.012) (.012)
Cohort 1.210 1.630*** 1.346** 1.195 1.398***
(.164) (.243) (.177) (.158) (.170)
Dataset: ESS (ref.) EVS 1.094 1.095 1.082 1.091 1.086
(.072) (.081) (.071) (.072) (.072)
WVS 1.307*** 1.276** 1.299*** 1.312*** 1.317***
(.122) (.130) (.121) (.122) (.123)
HDI .992 .969*** .968*** .989 .938***
(.014) (.011) (.011) (.011) (.012)
Weighted leave weeks 1.017** 1.017** 1.030*** 1.028*** 1.017**
(.008) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.008)
Total family benefits 1.040 1.084 .943 .945 1.161
(.108) (.119) (.104) (.099) (.112)
Gross enrolment pre-primary .999 1.000 .999 1.003 1.001
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Participation rate .998 .989* 1.003 1.012*** 1.004
(.004) (.006) (.004) (.005) (.004)
Life-long single rate .910*** .926*** .909*** .889*** .970
(.024) (.026) (.025) (.026) (.027)
Educational level: medium (ref.)
Low 1.343*** 1.268*** 1.348*** 1.343*** 1.315***
(.090) (.094) (.090) (.090) (.110)
High .756*** .705*** .719*** .728*** .630***
(.047) (.047) (.044) (.045) (.048)




































Level 2 random-effects variance .045 (.016) .031 (.014) .052 (.017) .043 (.015) .029 (.012)
Observations 15524 12376 15289 15136 15136
Number of groups 45 36 43 43 43
Note:***p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 8
Results of multilevel logistic regression on having at least two children on individual characteristics and country-cohort level variables interactions. Odds ratios.
Parity 2+ vs 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Age .985 .984 .986 .987 .987
(.010) (.011) (.010) (.010) (.010)
Cohort .786 1.080 .797 .679*** .760*
(.134) (.170) (.115) (.100) (.109)
Dataset: ESS (ref.) EVS 1.119** 1.092 1.109* 1.130** 1.127**
(.064) (.069) (.064) (.065) (.065)
WVS .994 1.018 .989 1.002 .997
(.078) (.088) (.078) (.079) (.079)
HDI 1.027 1.011 1.008 1.047*** 1.019
(.020) (.012) (.014) (.014) (.018)
Weighted leave weeks .996 .986 1.010 1.012 .998
(.012) (.009) (.011) (.010) (.010)
Total family benefits .973 1.019 .850 .849 .969
(.144) (.129) (.113) (.107) (.129)
Gross enrolment pre-primary .997 .997 .999 1.003 1.001
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Participation rate 1.000 .984** .999 1.005 .999
(.006) (.006) (.005) (.005) (.005)
Life-long single rate .993 .991 .973 .918** 1.039
(.036) (.033) (.033) (.033) (.040)
Educational level: medium (ref.)
Low 1.293*** 1.282*** 1.296*** 1.274*** 1.150*
(.074) (.081) (.075) (.074) (.084)
High .936 .912 .923 .909 .848**
(.052) (.057) (.052) (.053) (.062)




































Level 2 random-effects variance .132 .034 .059 .019 .096 .026 .084 .023 .089 .025
Observations 13587 10854 13369 13228 13228
Number of groups 45 36 43 43 43
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Table 9
Results of multilevel logistic regression on having at least three children on individual characteristics and country-cohort level variables interactions. Odds ratios.
Parity 3+ vs 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Age 0.995 0.988 0.994 0.995 0.995
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Cohort 0.989 1.004 0.923 0.730* 0.828
(0.197) (0.217) (0.143) (0.129) (0.132)
Dataset: ESS (ref.) EVS 0.945 0.994 0.943 0.955 0.957
(0.051) (0.060) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052)
WVS 0.909 0.945 0.914 0.916 0.924
(0.066) (0.076) (0.066) (0.067) (0.068)
HDI 0.985 1.006 0.989 1.029* 0.991
(0.003) (0.017) (0.015) (0.018) (0.020)
Weighted leave weeks 0.983 0.980 0.996 0.990 0.976**
(0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011)
Total family benefits 1.095 1.165 0.975 0.960 1.136
(0.196) (0.217) (0.145) (0.155) (0.176)
Gross enrolment pre-primary 0.999 0.996 0.999 1.003 1.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Participation rate 1.005 0.989 1.000 1.004 0.997
(0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Life-long single rate 0.974 0.976 0.986 0.913** 1.053
(0.043) (0.047) (0.037) (0.041) (0.046)
Educational level: medium (ref.) Low 1.503*** 1.549*** 1.500*** 1.462*** 1.375***
(0.078) (0.090) (0.079) (0.077) (0.096)
High 0.938 0.986 0.941 0.932 0.969
(0.051) (0.062) (0.053) (0.052) (0.073)




































Level 2 random-effects variance .207 050 .163 .045 .129 .033 .159 .041 .132 .034
Observations 13587 10854 13369 13228 13228
Number of groups 45 36 43 43 43
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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and its squared term (Model 7).25 All these variables are centred around
the mean to ease the interpretation of their coefficients.
Finally, in Table 7,8 and 9, we include in the models the cross-level
interactions of the aggregate variables by the women’s educational level.
4.2.1. Part-time employment
Model 3 of Table 4 shows that the share of part-time employment is
negatively associated to the odds of having at least one child (odds ratios
of 0.989, with p < 0.05), also when taking individual characteristics into
account. In contrast, the coefficient is not significantly associated with
P2+ and P3+ (Model 3 Tables 5 and 6). This result points out that,
overall, women are not more likely to have an additional child where the
prevalence of part-time employment is higher. In other words, our
findings, similarly to Baizán, Arpino, and Delclós (2016)), seem not
consistent with the idea that a (relatively) high quantity of part time jobs
embodies an appealing response to low fertility tout court. Whether the
quality and not the quantity of part time jobs represents a better in-
dicator is a matter that our data do not allow us to further investigate.
However, since a higher availability of part-time jobs goes hand in hand
with a lower quality of part-time positions (Del Boca & Sauer, 2009), we
convey that we observe a negative association between this macro-di-
mension and P1+ merely because we are capturing this specific aspect.
We then include to our model an interaction term to explore whether
the association varies according to women’s educational level (Model 1 of
Tables 7,8 and 9). Two noticeable observations emerge from this inter-
action, when we focus on first parity. First, the degree to which women
have accesses to part-time jobs is negatively associated with the like-
lihood of having at least one child for all the educational groups (.991
p < 0.10). Second, this association seems more relevant for better-edu-
cated women; in other words, a higher prevalence of part time jobs is
accompanied by a higher educational differential in childlessness –
compared with low educated women.26 However, regarding P2+, a
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Fig. 3. Predicted probabilities of having at least one, two or three children by country level’s variable with 95 % confidence level intervals for pair-wise comparison.
25 The quadratic term is included in this model because a correct empirical
test of the Multiple Equilibrium theory on fertility behaviour requires the in-
clusion in the model specification of the squared term of gender egalitarianism
as a covariate (e.g. Arpino et al., 2015). In fact, one of the main propositions of
the theory of Esping-Andersen and Billari (2015 is that “fertility or marital
stability will decline as the traditional equilibrium erodes and no new norma-
tive regime has taken its place. When a new stable equilibrium gains ground,
we should see a return to outcomes that are more equitable and that better
match individual preferences”. An empirical test of the post-modernist variant
of the SDT theory on fertility does not need a quadratic term of the indicator(s)
of post-modernism since it does not conceive any U-shaped association between
post-modernism and fertility (or other demographic outcomes considered).
Inspired by the rise of Post-Materialism (Inglehart, 1971), proponents of this
theory expect that different pace of secularization corresponds to different level
of fertility in a sort of a continuous gradual change. More specifically, they
theorize that the emergence of secularization would bring to a reduction of the
level of fertility (van de Kaa, 2001). In this sense the transition would lead to a
decrease in fertility “the cohort fertility […] is expected to reach a maximum
value well below replacement” (van de Kaa, 2002: 10). Thus, we have not found
any empirical article on the association between post-modernism and fertility
testing a U-shaped relationship (e.g. Aassve, Sironi, & Bassi, 2011; Brons,
Liefbroer, & Ganzeboom, 2017; Merz & Liefbroer, 2012).
26 We find that the comparison of the part-time availability slopes for medium
versus low educated is not significant (p= 0.594). However, the test comparing
the slopes of high educated versus low educated women is significant
(p=0.059).
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negative relationship of the spread of part-time work is found only for
lower educated women (for other educational categories the coefficient is
not significant). We find a positive association with P3+ for medium and
highly educated women - while it is not significant for lower educated.
To convey a sense of the magnitude of these results, we estimate and
illustrate in Fig. 3 the predicted probabilities of P1+, P2+ and P3+ for
the three educational groups on different levels of female part-time
employment based on Model 1 of Tables 7,8 and 9. We can see in Fig. 3
(first column of the first panel) that, for all the educational groups, the
probability of having at least one child is lower in countries with a high
prevalence of part-time employment (corresponding to the observed
value in Netherlands and Switzerland) than in countries characterised
by a low availability (corresponding to the observed value for a group
of Eastern European countries).
The educational gap in childlessness is found in countries with low
and medium but also high level of part-time employment, where it is
especially pronounced. We observe that, in the case of an increase of
the rate of part time from 5 % to 55 %, the predicted probability of
having at least one child for the class of tertiary educated is associated
with a decrease from about 87 % to about 76 % (while for the class of
lower educated it falls from 92 % to 88 %). Thus, extensive part-time
employment is associated with a higher quota of childless women and,
in parallel, with a wider educational ladder.
At the opposite pole, the availability of part-time employment is
related to P2+ for the sole group of lower educated women, employing
a depressing role on their chances of having at least two children – note
that the magnitude of the related coefficient is slight. Moreover, we
observe that a substantial educational gap for P2+ characterizes only
countries with a low level of part time jobs since it disappears in so-
cieties where the availability of part-time positions is relatively high. In
such a context, low and high-educated women have similar propensities
of being mother for the second time. However, when we focus on P3+,
we observe a jump from 30 % to 50 % of the corresponding predicted
probabilities for higher educated (and also for middle educated) – while
we do not observe any changes for lower educated women.
Conversely, the empirical results suggest that part-time availability
is heterogeneously associated with the final number of parities since
this relationship varies according to the educational group and the
outcome variable considered.
Broadly speaking, we see that an increment of part-time positions is
not per se a valid instrument to increase fertility outcomes. Thus, there
is little support for the claim that creation of part-time positions is an
incontrovertible policy tool supporting simultaneously the reproductive
behaviour and the reduction of the educational gradient. Our analyses
seem to suggest, instead, that the availability of part-time employment
has a positive association with childlessness and with an expansion of
its gradient. The marked relationship between part-time availability
and childlessness for highly educated could be explained by part-time
job as synonymous of lower paying occupations and less career devel-
opment (Del Boca & Sauer, 2009). Furthermore, since a high prevalence
of part-time jobs is consistent with the diffusion of male breadwinner/
female part-time career model (Pfau-Effinger, 2005), highly educated
women may find more difficult to establish themselves as equal (or
first) earner where female employment is dominated by part-time jobs.
In this kind of context, one possible strategy adopted by higher edu-
cated women to avoid career penalties is to withdraw motherhood in
order to maintain less common full-time positions.
These considerations cannot be directly applied to the selected po-
pulation of women who have already become mothers. In this case, we
find that the share of part-time jobs is associated with the absence of a
gradient for both P2+, depressing low educated propensities, and P3+,
enhancing high and middle educated propensities. Accordingly, we
convey that male breadwinner/female part-time career model is not ne-
gatively associated with higher order parities for better educated. The
one and half model seems not in conflict with the likelihood of having
higher order births at least for those with higher human capital.
4.2.2. Public sector employment
Model 4 of Table 4–6 shows that the relationship between the size of
public employment and first, second and third(plus) births is overall
positive and that the related coefficients are statistically significant. This
indicates that women living in countries with a more extensive public
sector employment are more likely to have larger family compared to
women of other countries. The higher magnitude of the coefficient is
observed for the P2+ (odds ratio of 1.027 p < 0.01) while it is slightly
weaker for P1+ (1.018 p < 0.01) and for P3+ (1.016 p < 0.1). This
result is in line with the idea of the state as employer and family-work
reconciliation catalyst (Adsera, 2005): the ‘insurance’ of job stability in
case of motherhood and the provision of family support are likely to
make easier for women to become mothers and to have large families.
When exploring whether this association varies according to wo-
men’s educational level (Model 2 of Table 7–9), we find that it is
stronger for higher educated women when we consider P1 + . In other
words, we observe that an increase in the availability of public sector
employment is associated with a decrease of childlessness and with a
weakening of the educational divide (Fig. 3, second column, first
panel). More specifically, whereas in contexts (such as Luxemburg)
with a limited public sector employment, higher educated women have
a probability of about 73 % of having at least one child (versus 88 % for
low educated) in the case of societies with extended public sector jobs
(such as Iceland) the equivalent probability is higher than 90 % - the
same predicted probability as for lower educated.
While public sector employment is positively associated with P2+
and P3+, we do not observe, for the same outcomes, any significant
reduction in the educational gradient related to the increase of public
employment. These results indicate that, in a context of an extensive
public sector employment, second and third motherhoods seems to get
more ‘affordable’ for all the educational groups.
Broadly speaking, our empirical evidence is likely to challenge the
theoretical tenets of the welfare state paradox argument according to
which higher public employment levels come at the expense of op-
portunities for high-educated women. We instead observe that a higher
supply of public employment is positively associated with reproductive
choices especially for women with higher income potential. The latent
underlined mechanism is that a higher availability of public sector jobs
translates into a reduction of the indirect costs of motherhood (Rønsen
& Skrede, 2010). Moreover, where public sector employment is a more
common option, women may feel more secure about their future, thus
perceiving better conditions for become mothers (Martin Garcia &
Castro-Martin, 2013). Therefore, public employment seems to be as-
sociated to a rebound fertility. In response to the continuous political
attacks against public sector (as reported by Laird, 2017), our findings
suggest that public employment (as a work-life balance) instrument
looks like a potential resource for fertility recover. Moreover, we show
that it is likely to hamper educational gap in childlessness.
4.2.3. Strictness of EPL
Tables 4–6 show that the relationship between the level of strictness
of EPL and P1+, P2+ and P3+ is negative and that all the related
coefficients are statistically significant (Model 5 Tables 4–6).
In line with previous studies (Adsera, 2005), our results confirm that
women tend to have lower parity progressions as the degree of rigidity
of labour market increases. Overall, this result suggests that a rigid
labour market regulation is associated with unfavourable conditions for
childbearing. The coefficient size appears particularly large for P2+
(odds ratio .768, p < 0.01) and P3+ (odds ratio .707, p < 0.01), while
it is slightly smaller for P1+ (odds ratio .889, p < 0.1), indicating that
the proportion of first-, second- and third-time mothers is smaller in
contexts with highly regulated labour markets.
We then explore whether the relationship between EPL and fertility
outcomes varies according to the educational level of the female re-
spondent. The cross-level interaction between the level of EPL and women’s
education (Model 3 Tables 7–9) indicates that there is not any change for
D. Bellani Research in Social Stratification and Mobility 66 (2020) 100482
16
the negative gradient associated to the level of EPL (around the mean).
Fig. 3 (third column) does not show any recovering association
between EPL and P1+, P2+ and P3+ for higher educated women
compared to low-educated. Moreover, we observe from the Fig. 3 that
the negative educational gradient is particularly evident for medium-
high level of EPL for all the outcomes.
One could convey that rigid strict regulation of labour markets,
mainly designed to protect mature male workers (Rueda, 2005), is
likely to hinder fertility realizations for all the women’s educational
groups. However, the motivations behind the decision to limit family
size under strict EPL may be different for low and high-educated
women. In the case of low educated women, children may get less af-
fordable within contexts of limited job stability and poorer working
conditions. Higher educated women, even if less at risk to be trapped in
poorly-protected labour market segment (Mills & Blossfeld, 2013), may
have the perception that motherhood exposes them to the risk to be
excluded by firm-internal promotions (Brinton & Lee, 2016). As a
consequence, strict EPL, hampering the dual role of mother and
-worker, may lead women with college education to be more likely to
bypass fertility desires.
4.2.4. Post-modernist variant of SDT
In Tables 4–6 (Model 4) we observe that, for all the outcome vari-
ables considered, there is a negative association with the level of se-
cularization – as a proxy of post-modernist attitudes.
Given the large percentage of people who adopt post-modernist
attitudes (from about 7 % to about 82 %) the apparent small odds ratios
suggest instead a not negligible relationship – particularly for higher
parities. Consistent with SDT predictions, our findings show that in
more secular societies, where the normative disapproval of child-
lessness and of small families is weaker (Koropeckyj‐Cox & Pendell,
2007), the probability of having one or more children is lower.
However, when focusing on the interactions between the macro-
level variable and women’s education (Tables 7–9, Model 3), one
should note that the childbearing patterns of women with low educa-
tion are dissimilar to those with higher educated levels (Model 3
Table 7).
To ease the interpretation, the graphs in Fig. 3 plot the predicted
probability of P1+, P2+ and P3+ by educational level and by the
degree of post-modernism. Calculations suggest that highly educated
women have lower predicted probabilities associated with P1+, P2+
and P3+, compared to their low- education counterparts – when they
live in contexts characterised by a narrow diffusion of post-modernist
attitudes.27 We can also see, in Fig. 3, that the predicted differences
between high and low educated women are estimated with a higher
statistical precision around average values of the macro level variable
(as shown by the confidence interval). This means that in societies
where about half of the population adhere to secular values, the edu-
cational divide is likely to be more definite. Our findings describe,
overall, a restriction of the educational differentials for all the parities
in contexts where the adoption of post-modernist value orientation is
far-reaching (where about more than 80 % of the population accept
post-modernist orientations). These results are likely to be consistent
with the expectation of the post-modernist variant of the SDT theory
about the decline of the educational gradient in ‘less altruistic’ societies.
However, when we look more closely at the data, we note that the
decline is more evident for the reproductive choices of the group of less
educated women, a result that diverges somewhat from the theoretical
predictions. In fact, we can see that – for women with a college edu-
cation – the predicted probability of P1+ for average level of post-
modernism is about 84 % while it is about 82 % for the maximum level
(the difference is not statistically significant); these values are about 94
% and 84 %, respectively, for low-educated women (the difference is
statistically significant).
Thus, whereas highly-educated women are identified as the front
runners of individualistic values and practices also in fertility behaviour
(Lesthaeghe & Surkyn, 2007), the emergence and the diffusion of post-
modernist values does not seem to be a strong predictor of their birth
progressions, indicating that this group seems only marginally reactive
to the variability of this contextual factor. The rise and the diffusion of
post-modernist values (Lesthaeghe, 2010) appears to be more related to
the fertility choices of women with less education.
We convey that, as the choice of parenthood becomes more de-
traditionalised, women with less human capital are likely to lose their
advantages in parity progression. As some scholars (Mills, Blossfeld, &
Klijzing, 2005; Perelli-Harris et al., 2010) have acknowledged, women
with less education living in countries characterised by a weakening of
the family as an institution have faced the major alteration of tradi-
tional patterns of family life (see also Lichter, Turner, & Sassler, 2010).
Hence, in societies characterised by a high degree of post-modernism,
poorly educated women seem less likely to convert their intimate re-
lationships into long-term commitments. The ultimate outcome for low
educated women is an exceptional increase in childlessness and a de-
crease in parity progression – as suggested by our empirical findings.
Additionally, since the disruption of traditional values goes hand in
hand with the emerging preference for a more consumption-oriented
lifestyle, women with less education are likely to become less attractive
in the marriage market (Goldscheider et al., 2015; Oppenheimer,
1995). This seems not be the case for highly educated women, them-
selves advantaged by their better economic prospects (Stevenson &
Wolfers, 2007; Wilk, 1991).
4.2.5. Multiple equilibrium
We estimate multilevel models to test whether the probability of
having at least one, two or three(plus) children varies by the degree of
acceptance of gender egalitarianism. As will be recalled, the Multiple
Equilibrium framework predicts a U-shape relationship. And indeed,
the estimations reported in Tables 4–6, Model 7, show a better fit when
we additionally include a squared term of the gender egalitarianism
indicator. The coefficient of the squared term is positive and statisti-
cally significant for all the models. For P1+ and P3+ also the linear
term is positive and statistically significant while this is not the case for
P2 + .
Tables 7–9 report the micro-macro interaction associations between
women’s education and the gender egalitarianism variable (and its
square). This serves to test whether higher education for women is
strictly associated to the level of gender equity in their fertility deci-
sions.
Focusing on P1+, Table 7, Model 5 shows a positive and statisti-
cally significant interaction of the squared term of the contextual
variable only with the category corresponding to tertiary education.
The results are somewhat different for P2+ and P3 + .
To ease interpretation of the results, Fig. 3 (last column) plots the
predicted probabilities related to P1+, P2+ and P3+ by education for
different levels of gender egalitarianism. When we focus on P1+, the
graph shows that the U-shape pattern mirrors only higher educated
women’s propensities. The relationship between gender equity and
P1+ is initially negative and then turns positive only for this educa-
tional group. We observe also that when gender egalitarianism assumes
values close to the average, tertiary educated women have the lowest
probability of P1+ (the predicted probability is 77 % and it is about 12
percentage points lower than less educated). Predicted probabilities are
similar between the two groups in case of both low and extremely high
levels of the macro variable. Interestingly, focusing on low educated
women, we do not find any statistically significant difference in their
probability of being childless along the distribution of the contextual
factor.
27 It has to be noted that the indicator we use refers to secularism, that is one
dimension of post-modernism. Data limitations hinder the use of a composite
index of post-modernism.
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In the case of P2+, we find a U-shape relationship for all the edu-
cational groups, that is especially marked for higher educated. We
observe a negative gradient only for societies characterised by average
value of acceptance of gender egalitarianism. In other words, low or
high levels of approval of gender egalitarianism are associated with a
higher likelihood of P2+ that also leads to a reduction of the gradient.
Focusing on the last panel, it turns out that, for that macro variable,
there is not a U-shape relationship in the case of P3+ for higher edu-
cated women– while this is the case for lower educated. Highly and
lowly educated have similar chances to have a third child only where
the level of gender egalitarianism is far above its average value, and not
where it is below.
In summary, the expectations of Multiple Equilibrium framework find
consistent empirical support in our analysis. In fact, we observe that living
in contexts with low or high levels of gender egalitarianism is overall as-
sociated with both higher progression rates and to a small gradient - while
the opposite is true for societies characterised by partial support.
This final set-up result reinforces the impression of a sharp educa-
tional gap in fertility outcomes in countries that are posited in a so-
called Unstable Equilibrium. Instead, when embedded in contexts
characterised by a dominance in beliefs about women’s proper roles, no
matter whether they are traditional or egalitarian, higher and lower
educated women generally experience similar fertility outcomes.
We convey that, as long as gender roles are strongly dominated by a
traditional family model and partners’ specialisation – as is supposed to
be the case for societies characterised by a low gender-egalitarianism
approval, women’s domestic and caring duties are strictly defined and
univocal (Bellani et al., 2017). This may be the reason why, in tradi-
tional societies, we observe that both high- and low-educated women
conform to societal expectations by having at least two children. In
parallel, in contexts where gender egalitarianism has gained dom-
inance, a universal support of new gender orientation is likely to con-
tribute to the construction of an innovative model of partnership based
on an egalitarian-based, dual earners – dual career couple. On this view,
women with university-level education are less likely to renounce
motherhood. In such a context, men strongly legitimate the notion of
mother working and, further, express preferences for their own active
participation in the unpaid work, comprising childcare. Hence, anti-
traditionalist attitudes about gender roles seem to play a key-role for a
rebound of fertility accompanied by a decrease of the educational
gradient.
4.3. Robustness checks
Although for the purpose of this article we are more interested in
cross-national than cross-temporal variation in gender egalitarianism, we
demonstrate the robustness of our findings controlling for between-
country heterogeneity by adding to our models fixed-effects for coun-
tries. In this way, we consider only the within (longitudinal) variation in
contextual variables. Thus, we estimate two-level models with in-
dividuals nested into country-cohort and with the inclusion of country
fixed-effects, aimed at capturing country-level time invariant factors.
Given that fixed-effects capture macro characteristics of the countries, we
do not to include macro-level controls. One of the advantages of this
approach is that we can test whether the relationships between gender
egalitarianism and P1+, P2+ and P3+ are robust to the presence of
country-level, time-invariant factors, i.e. this association is not biased
even in the presence of these unobserved confounders. Note that the
potentiality of this approach is, however, limited by the low variance of
gender egalitarianism in its across-time component. Table A3 and the
corresponding Fig. A1 (where we reported predicted probabilities for
each parity) show that the moderator role played by gender egalitar-
ianism on the educational gradient is only marginally affected by the
inclusion of country fixed-effects (as compared to the main results pre-
sented in Tables 7,8 and 9). Results are supported also when we in-
troduce into the model an interaction between country dummies and
educational level (see in the Appendix, Table A6 and Fig. A4). 28 As an
additional robustness check, we ran supplementary models controlling
also for the interaction between education and one of the contextual
variables considered as moderators. Models in Table A4 (Models 1–4)
replicates the specification of Tables 7–9, column 5 by including, one at a
time, the interactions between education and level of part-time em-
ployment (Model 1), level of public employment (Model 2), EPL (Model
3), and level of post modernism (Model 4). The sign and the magnitude
of the coefficients of interest are not affected by the inclusion of these
controls. The predicted probabilities represented in Fig. A2 confirm the
view that the educational gradient varies according to the level of gender
egalitarianism, thus suggesting there are not fundamental differences
with the results presented in the previous section. The only exception is
related to Model 2 of Table A4 (see related predicted probabilities of Fig.
A2, second column). In this case, it seems that the interaction between
public employment and level of education captures, at least partly, the
magnitude of the association for P1+ and P2 + . One interpretation of
this empirical evidence is that countries worth a high level of gender
egalitarianism are those where the proportion of public sector jobs is
high and where female full-time employment rates converge with that of
men. Under certain condition, this could generate pressure on male
partners to adapt to the women’s new role (Esping-Andersen, 2016, p.
46). Moreover, countries where public sector jobs are more widespread
are those where higher educated women are more likely to be employed
as public servants (in semi-qualified jobs), compared to their less-edu-
cated counterpart. This seems to suggest that controlling for the inter-
action between public employment and education, the second portion of
the U-shaped relationship between gender egalitarianism and P1+ and
P2+ for high-educated individuals is partly captured by the interaction.
Another robustness check that we implement is related to a possible
limitation deriving from the fact that our models do not include all con-
textual variables in a single model. In order to verify the robustness of our
results when all contextual factors of interest are controlled for, we present
estimates for the interaction between education and gender egalitarianism
(and its square), where level of part-time employment, level of public
employment, EPL and level of post modernism are controlled (all to-
gether). Model 5 confirms that the educational gradient is moderated by
the level of gender egalitarianism in a manner that is consistent with re-
sults reported in the main text (see also the fifth column of Fig. A2).
We also implemented an additional robustness check. Given the issue of
unobserved heterogeneity that upsurged in considering P2+ and P3+, we
estimate all the regression models using the total number of children as the
dependent variable. Since this is a count variable, we employed a multilevel
Poisson’s regression model (e.g. Baizan et al. 2016). According to the results
reported in Table A5 and Fig. A3, the level of availability of part-time
employment seems to decrease the educational gradient throughout a re-
duction of the fertility of low-educated women, as observed for P1+ in the
main models. The findings also suggest that, as in the main analyses on
parities, the educational gradient is not strictly influenced by availability of
public employment or by the strictness of EPL. Results about part-time
availability are also robust when we delate from the analysis the countries
with the extreme values of part-time availability. See Table A7.
Finally, analyses on the educational gradient of completed fertility
confirm that both a high level of post-modernism and a high diffusion of
gender egalitarianism are associated with a reduction of the educa-
tional gap.
5. Conclusions
The negative association between women's educational attainment
and fertility, essentially, has always been an uncontested statement in
28 Specifically, we calculated the mean of gender egalitarianism within
country considering the two periods and then we subtracted to each value of
gender egalitarianism (one for period) the mean of the variable.
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social sciences. However, recent contributions have shown a reverse in
the educational gradient in some European countries but not in others.
In seeking to address this issue, our study has extensively examined the
interplay between structural and cultural factors. As previous literature has
shown, their contribution is crucial to the regulation of economic and social
relations within families and to the process of social stratification of re-
productive choices. Specifically, this article has attempted to widen the
conventional perspective of the societal determinants of the educational
gradient of fertility, in two ways. First of all, we have gained more
knowledge about the role played by structural and ideational conditions
that sociological and demographic research only partially analysed. Second,
we have expanded the theoretical and analytical focus to specific parities.
Theorists of the New Home Economics have traditionally posited that
labour market regulation, among other individual institutions, represents a
crucial determinant of fertility differentials between educational classes.
This is because it alters the opportunity costs of motherhood dissimilarly
across educational groups. According to this perspective, a family-friendly
labour market setting, decreasing the opportunity costs of childrearing
through the promotion of part-time opportunities, the development of the
public sector employment and/or the reinforcement of legal restrictions to
dismissals, should lead to a reduction of the educational stratification in
reproductive behaviour. Our results show instead that, from an associative
point of view, it does not systematically alter the gradient. Rather, its in-
fluence, depends on the parity progression considered.
More specifically, our findings imply a discrepancy between the
conventional belief that part-time opportunities are positively related to
childbearing and, on the other hand, evidence that highly educated
women are more likely to forgo motherhood in case of high availability
of part-time jobs. Moreover, this study challenges the assertion that
policies aimed at reducing work-family incompatibility through a strict
regulation of employment contracts are suitable to narrow fertility
educational differentials. We find, instead, that rigid labour markets,
that mainly privilege middle-aged male workers, not only are asso-
ciated with a steeper educational gradient of childlessness but also have
a negative relationship with each specific parity progression.
Nevertheless, we observe that where labour market regulation is
oriented to women’s empowerment through the promotion of stable
and (semi)professional careers in the public sector, an overall increase
in parity progression and a reduction of the educational gap in child-
lessness are found.
In short, within its theoretical framework, the New Economics fra-
mework should embody the contributions of an emerging literature that
– together with this study – assesses that the role of women’s education
would become weaker where labour markets are converted into more
oriented to favouring long-term careers for mothers (and more
prompted to endorse their working opportunities). Thus, it appears that
the explanation of the heterogeneity of the educational gradient in re-
productive behaviour is not just a matter of a “crude” calculus of the
opportunity costs. Instead it should embrace a deep reconsideration of
more nuanced mechanisms related to women’s autonomy and em-
powerment in different phases of their reproductive life stage.
In this regard, a number of studies have highlighted that a more
crucial factor is represented by a progressive reconfiguration of family
ideals and, in particular, by the degree of rejection of traditional stan-
dards in the individuals’ private sphere. Even if not exerting a direct
influence on the opportunity costs of motherhood, these elements cul-
turally affect family-life preferences and shape perceptions of in-
compatibility of woman’s responsibilities as mother and worker. While
the post-modernist variant of the SDT theory mainly interprets the
discharge of traditionalism as an opposition to religious beliefs about
family ideals, the Multiple Equilibrium paradigm identifies it as a
gender role reconfiguration about who is the appropriate breadwinner.
From our results it appears that a widespread religious secularization,
that is strongly associated with abandoning the ideal type of traditional
family, actually constitutes a cultural aspect that may lead to a decrease
of the steepness of the educational gradient of fertility by parity.
However, there is little evidence that higher-educated women are in-
fluenced by the diffusion of these new values regarding their re-
productive choices. Instead the mechanism at play here is mostly asso-
ciated with a depression of fertility of lower educated women. In fact, we
observe that in more individualistic societies they represent the most
disadvantageous educational group in terms of fertility progressions.
Thus, from our empirical analysis, the indication that higher edu-
cated women, identified as the avant-garde clientele of post-modernism,
are not appreciably responsive, in their reproductive choices, to the de-
gree of acceptance of post-modernist attitudes partly undermines the
predictions of the theory. Our findings seem to suggest that the post-
modernist variant of SDT, considering less-family preferences (as child-
lessness acceptance) as the sole results of the rejection of traditional
values, goes too far in assuming the impossibility of a reconciliation
between anti-conservative family attitudes and pro-family behaviours.
What this theory seems to miss is interpreting the diffusion of post-
modernist attitudes as compatible with the spread of other cultural forces
related to new forms of pro-family orientations. Indeed, an explanation
incorporating the emerging of new gender values as the other face of the
disruption of traditional family ideals should better account for the re-
productive choices of highly educated women. This argument suggests
that attitudinal orientations that, adhering to an unconventional new
family model (complying with gender empowerment), can better predict
the reproductive behaviour of women with college education.
In line with this argument, we find that, in societies with a broad
diffusion of gender egalitarian attitudes, the educational gradient is
narrow. Given that highly-educated women are more career committed
and are more likely to command economic resources, they seem inclined
toward having babies only if their partner adheres to gender-egalitarian
principles (and this is the case where acceptance of gender egalitarianism
is almost universal). In this sense, the costs of motherhood appear
strongly reduced where fathers are more oriented to socializing the costs
of domestic duties. Instead, within those societies where traditional
gender values have waned but gender egalitarianism remains poorly
diffused, the odds of being childless or having small families peak for
highly educated women. Thus, it does seem that egalitarian gender va-
lues, enhancing the participation of men in domestic and caring duties,
can neutralize fertility disadvantages of higher educated women. The
general implication of our findings is that the diffusion of egalitarian
norms could represent a resource to establish a new equilibrium char-
acterised by smaller educational gaps in reproductive behaviour and a
general higher level of fertility, for both high and low educated women.
Our study is subject to main limitations that imply being cautious in
interpreting our results as definitive evidence. First of all, this study is
limited by the cross-sectional design. Even if this approach is widely em-
ployed because it allows for comparative analysis across a large number of
countries, it limits our capacity to draw causal results. However, to date, no
longitudinal data exist on completed fertility in numerous European regions
– even if Kolk (2019) goes in this direction. Another caveat relates to the
bias in sorting groups into educational classes – given that the selectivity
into educational tracks differs across countries. A possible extension of this
article should consider the relative approach to education thus making
human capital more comparable across countries. Third, our regression
results may suffer of endogeneity bias. More specifically, the women who
constitute the sample at risk of having a second or third child may represent
a group with unobservable characteristics that are not common among
childless women. Thus, our findings may be driven by the selected nature of
the groups. Future research should detect whether these selection processes
biased our results. Fourth, given the limitation of the available data, we are
not able to consider a relevant contextual factor that partly drives the fer-
tility decisions of higher educated women, that is childcare services for
children aged 0–2 (Bavel & Różańska-Putek, 2010). In parallel, future
contributions, given the increasingly availability of data on attitudes, would
enrich our empirical results implementing a more refined index of post-
modernism. A final concern of our study is that we are not able to consider
all the indicators of interest and the interaction with educational level at
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once. For this reason, future studies should develop an integrated model of
structural and cultural characteristics through a composite indicator that
allows for their quantitative assessment. Doing that, one could also consider
contextual factors that have been overlooked in this study, such as more
refined indicators of family policies, but also political factors that are likely
to shape fertility decisions (for a review see Balbo, Billari, & Mills, 2013).
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Fig. A1. Predicted probabilities of having at least one, two or three children with 95 % confidence level intervals for pair-wise comparison, within component.












































































































































































Fig. A2. Predicted probabilities of having at least one (first row), two (second row) or three (third row) children by country level’s gender equity with 95 %
confidence level intervals for pair-wise comparison.
Note. First column includes interaction between part time and level of education. Second column includes interaction between public employment and level of
education. Third column includes interaction between EPL and level of education. Fourth column includes interaction between post modernism and level of edu-
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Fig. A3. Predicted number of children by country level’s variable with 95 % confidence level intervals for pair-wise comparison.




























Fig. A4. Predicted probabilities of having at least one, two or three children with 95 % confidence level intervals for pair-wise comparison, including country-
education fixed effects.
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Table A1
Structure of the data: women by birth-cohorts and countries, pooled dataset, initial sample.
Country cohort 1 cohort 2 Total
No. No. No.
AT 322 566 888
BE 332 364 696
CH 379 439 818
CZ 323 247 570
DE 591 704 1295
DK 290 300 590
EE . 354 354
ES 293 397 690
FI 374 359 733
FR 390 403 793
GB 304 358 662
GR 236 252 488
HU . 313 313
IE 337 322 659
IS 84 104 188
LU 154 199 353
NL 438 440 878
NO 341 376 717
PL 436 370 806
PT 375 351 726
SE 380 366 746
SI . 363 363
SK 346 313 659
TR 257 338 595
Total 6982 8598 15580
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Table A3
Results of Multilevel logistic regression on having at least one child, two and three children on individual characteristics and country
fixed effects and egalitarianism. Odds ratios.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Age 1.008 0.996 1.001
(0.012) (0.011) (0.010)
Cohort 1.053 0.864 .708***
(0.140) (0.099) (0.076)
Dataset: ESS (ref.)
EVS 1.143* 1.118* 0.943
(0.080) (0.070) (0.054)
WVS 1.359*** 1.027 0.920
(0.132) (0.086) (0.069)
Educational level: medium (ref.)
Low 1.375*** 1.107 1.375***
(0.125) (0.089) (0.103)
High 0.621*** 0.861* 0.951
(0.050) (0.070) (0.077)
Gender egalitarianism 1.002 1.005 1.026***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
*low education 0.997 0.993 0.997
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
*high education 1.006 0.997 1.010***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Gender egalitarianism 2 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
*low education 1.000 1.000** 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
*high education 1.001*** 1.000* 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Country fixed effects YES YES YES
Observations 13472 11710 9297
Number of groups 36 36 36
Note: ***p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A5
Estimates of a series of two-level Poisson’s regression models for completed fertility on individual characteristics and country-cohort level variables interactions.
Number of children Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Age 0.999 0.998 0.999 0.999 0.999
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Cohort 1.017 1.114** 1.025 0.957 1.006
(0.058) (0.059) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046)
Dataset: ESS (ref.) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
EVS 1.022 1.025 1.021 1.025* 1.025
(0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
WVS 1.011 1.018 1.010 1.011 1.011
(0.021) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
HDI 0.997 0.995 0.992* 1.005 0.990*
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Weighted leave weeks 0.998 0.997 1.004 1.003 0.998
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Total family benefits 1.016 1.031 0.969 0.971 1.039
(0.053) (0.046) (0.043) (0.043) (0.046)
Enrolment pre-primary 1.000 0.999 1.000 1.001 1.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Participation rate 1.000 0.995** 1.000 1.003 1.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Life-long single rate 0.989 0.989 0.987 0.966*** 1.015
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
Educational level:
medium (ref.)
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Low 1.147*** 1.148*** 1.153*** 1.141*** 1.120***
(0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.022)
High 0.942*** 0.935*** 0.936*** 0.934*** 0.910***











































Observations 15568 12414 15333 15179 15179
Number of groups 45 36 43 43 43
Note: ***p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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